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Multilevel embeddedness in multilateral 
alliances: A conceptual framework1 
 
 
 
Sveinn Vidar Gudmundsson, Christian Lechner, and Hans van Kranenburg 
 
In this chapter we propose a conceptual framework for understanding of inter-partner 
dynamics in multilateral alliances involving common alliance processes, dyadic ties, and 
external transaction networks. The difference between alliance networks and multilateral 
alliances is the formalization of organization and common alliance processes in the latter. The 
firm-specific value in multilateral alliances is often buried in dyadic ties, that can be the 
prime motivator to join in the first place, but at the same time hindering common alliance 
processes. This multiplexity of relations, multilevel embeddedness, is both a source of 
strategic constraints and opportunities. Multilateral alliances set firms heading towards 
increased rigidity, cooperation and long-term orientation, requiring careful management of 
rising exit barriers to preserve strategic flexibility.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Alliance relations are institutional arrangements in which transactions take place (Richardson, 
1972; Lomi, 1995). They constitute a transaction sphere that is an alternative governance 
mode to market transactions and vertical integration (Richardson, 1972).  Alliances have 
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commonly been formed among two firms, a dyad, but increasingly by a block of firms, an 
alliance network (Doz & Hamel, 1998; Gomes-Casseres, 1996; Lazzarini, 2007; 
Vanhaverbeke & Noorderhaven, 2001). The literature draws up a picture of alliance networks 
and constellations clustering around a focal firm or a focal project (Das & Teng, 2002; Doz & 
Hamel, 1998; Vanhaverbeke & Noorderhaven, 2001), while our definition of multilateral 
alliances (MLA) is formalized multi-partner inter-firm relations that involve not only a 
collection of dyads, but also central organization and common alliance processes.  
Doz and Hamel (1998, p.221) suggest that firms engaged in multilateral alliances are 
"entangled in a complex web of interdependent relationships that tax their strategic cleverness 
and managerial skills." One way to understand the "complex web" is by engaging 
embeddedness theory. We understand inter-firm relations as a complex set of relations 
influencing and influenced by society they are embedded in. Embeddedness theory 
(Granovetter, 1985) helps to understand how networks of relations discourage mischief and 
influence choices through past interactions. Researchers have extended this work in various 
contexts such as cross-level embeddedness and overembeddedness (Hagedoorn, 2006; 
Hagedoorn & Frankort, 2008). Most of this research has focused on the influence of 
embeddedness on alliance formation but less on its influence on alliance dynamics.  
In alliance networks when there is an advantage in connecting resources through common 
processes and standards, a central organization needs to be formed due to the relational 
complexity. With formal organization, closure (Coleman, 1988) takes place, at the same time 
that dyadic relations continue to exist both internal and external to MLA. Instead of viewing 
MLA as replacing dyadic relations it can be seen as creaming the cake, an additional set of 
strong ties on top of the existing relations, a mix of network closure (Coleman, 1988) and 
exploitation of structural holes (Burt, 2001). However, little research exists on the benefits of 
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closure and structural holes in combination on one and the same alliance (Burt, 2001; 
Gudmundsson & Lechner, 2006).  
Our objective in this chapter is to explore the important question of how multilevel 
embeddedness influences MLA tensions, the exploitation of opportunities and how perceived 
barriers to exit influence the entry decision.  We start by discussing definitions of different 
forms of multi-partner alliances and particularly MLA, we then proceed to the theoretical 
perspectives that can be used to explain the multiplexity of MLA, we develop several 
propositions around our conceptual framework, and finally discuss the implications of our 
work.  
 
DEFINING MULTILATERAL ALLIANCES 
A body of research has examined alliance networks, alliance constellations and MLA (Das & 
Teng, 2002; Doz & Hamel, 1998; Gomes-Casseres, 1996; Gudmundsson & Lechner, 2006; 
Lazzarini, 2008; Vanhaverbeke & Noorderhaven, 2001). For sake of clarity in the remainder 
of this chapter we have listed definitions and the corresponding references in Table 1 to 
demonstrate how these three concepts have evolved. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Lazzarini (2008) argues that the term alliance constellation (Das & Teng, 2002; Gomes-
Casseres, 1996) has been used to denote both alliance networks and multilateral alliances and 
the two are not the same. A perspective from technology and software industries is likely to 
see a focal firm at the centre of alliance relations or a single project into which all the firms 
are linked. Such as the RISC (project) processor alliance described by Vanhaverbeke and 
Noorderhaven (2001) or Fujitsu (focal firm) mainframe computer alliance described by Doz 
and Hamel (1998). Such alliances are inherently short-term as the project either fails or is 
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completed. This brings up the question if constellations are more about projects and focal 
firms rather than a more permanent configuration of alliance relations. We could denote 
constellations as a ring of firms that constantly rearrange relations around projects and add or 
shed participants with redundant ties. These configurations are common in many industries 
including software and aerospace. However, permanent alliance arrangements are rarer such 
as we find in the airline industry (oneworld, Skyteam and STAR) where the project is the 
alliance itself a long-term vision of commonalities, but without any fixed completion time 
after which the partners rearrange within the alliance network. These arrangements are 
frequently found in network industries and services where interlinking of rights networks 
(legal operational boundaries) and the use of common standards are important.  
We like to draw a line between constellations that describe project or focal firm focused 
alliance networks having some formal arrangements between all partners, and MLA where 
formal arrangements are not project or focal firm focused and are not rearranged upon 
completion of projects. In other words a constellation and MLA are not the same, but both 
constitute a group of firms that compete with other groups of firms.  Our work focuses on 
multilateral alliances with central organization so we favour the term multilateral alliance 
(MLA) rather than constellation to underline a difference.   
 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES  
To understand the multiplexity of MLA it is necessary to engage several theoretical 
perspectives: tensions perspective (Das & Teng, 2000; De Rond & Bouchikhi, 2004), social 
network theory (Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1988; 1990), and embeddedness perspective 
(Granovetter, 1985). We cover each of these theoretical perspectives to unravel their 
significance in explaining MLA dynamics. 
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Tensions Perspective 
The dynamism of relations within MLA can be understood using a tensions perspective (Das 
& Teng, 2000). The tensions perspective sees alliances being subject to competing forces 
across three spectrums: cooperation versus competition; rigidity versus flexibility; and short-
term versus long-term.  
Competition is defined (Das & Teng, 2000, p. 85) “as pursuing one’s own interest at the 
expense of others” and cooperation “is the pursuit of mutual interests and common benefits.” 
In MLA a stronger opportunistic focal firm may attempt to contribute fewer resources and 
control more of the alliance benefits. In MLA where one firm is larger than the rest or is 
financially superior, opportunistic self-interest can develop and overtake cooperation. Since 
cooperation and competition are opposing forces an imbalance must be resolved (Das & 
Teng, 2000; Gudmundsson, 2011). Too much competition will see one partner seek to 
internalize the gains and unique resources of other partners (Khanna, Gulati, & Nohria, 1998; 
Yoshino & Rangan, 1995) or to control their actions. However, MLA can be considered to 
move along a continuum from competition to cooperation and balance the tension between 
competition and cooperation.  Too much competition due to high density in MLA will cause 
the exit of partners with redundant ties, whilst too much cooperation in MLA will lead to 
lock-in, strategic constraints and eventually a merger of inseparable firms (Gudmundsson & 
Lechner, 2011).2 
Rigidity (Das & Teng, 2000, p. 86) is defined “in terms of the degree of connectedness of 
members with each other in an ongoing relationship.” While flexibility is an opposing force, 
freedom of action or loose coupling, is usually considered integral to alliance formation. 
Firms start alliances opposed to mergers to retain flexibility. Flexibility allows faster 
realignment of resources to take advantage of opportunities, but rigidity reduces coordination 
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 One can also see the possibility of a domino effect if one partner declares bankruptcy other closely tied 
partners face the same fate unless the bankrupt firm is overtaken or merged to salvage common assets. 
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costs through stability and greater cohesion. From the perspective of the social network 
theory firms should focus on opportunities generated by structural holes, but exercise a 
degree of closure to realize the value buried in the holes (Burt, 2001). This is best 
accomplished in a multilateral alliance by balancing flexibility and rigidity. MLA increase 
rigidity as the connectedness among partners increases and cohesion through control 
escalates. The formalization of the MLA through a central organization increases rigidity and 
relational trust by regulating opportunistic behavior. The tension associated with too much 
rigidity, becoming tangled in one's own web, or over-embedded (Hagedoorn & Frankort, 
2008), poses a real paradox for MLA partners, reinforcing their desire to balance rigidity and 
flexibility. 
The third tension is between short-term and long-term orientation.  The MLA by nature of 
its central organization and required upfront investment pushes firms to take the long-view 
upon joining MLA. The more relational features there are in the MLA the greater the 
relations-specific investment, the stronger the long-term orientation of the alliance. The 
directional arrows in Figure 1 show the movement along the three tensions when firms enter 
MLA. Upon entry to MLA, partners move in certain directions all of which increase the likely 
duration of attachment (Gudmundsson, 2011). However, this does not exclude the possibility 
of imbalance leading to instability. There is tension between common benefits and specific 
benefits and MLA is likely to move towards too much rigidity, too much cooperation, and 
lock-in, unless managers maintain balance. MLA is no different from any other type of 
alliance when it comes to exploiting opportunities, to leverage unique resources to the 
maximum, and to maintain enough strategic flexibility to exit if needed. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
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Social Network Theory 
We draw parallel between social network theory (Barnes, 1954; Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 
1973) and network opportunities and constraints, to explain the link between MLA processes, 
the pursuit of opportunities, and structural holes and closure (Burt, 2001). Alliance processes 
can be described as the effective strengthening of alliance ties along a continuum between 
strong and weak ties (Granovetter, 1973). In the language of social network theory a 
structural-hole (Burt, 1992; 2001) represents an opportunity, un-served sphere that can be 
exploited by brokering connections between actors. The theory has been applied to alliance 
networks that have weak ties and lack central organization. A central position in a network is 
not the same as central organization in MLA that resembles rather network closure (Coleman, 
1988). Little research exists that explains networks having traits of both closure and structural 
holes (Burt, 2001; Gudmundsson & Lechner, 2006). This poses a particularly interesting 
dynamics as firms can access opportunities embedded in structural holes across various levels 
and varying relational intensities within the boundaries of a single MLA. Such group of firms 
is embedded in a closed network of common alliance processes with central organization, 
embedded in an alliance network of dyadic alliances (within the closed network), and the 
closed network in its entirety is embedded in the sum of all external transaction relations of 
the partner firms. 
In MLA each partner occupies a central position characterized by weak to strong ties. The 
strong ties represent closure (Coleman, 1988) and the weak ties structural holes (Burt, 1992). 
Whereas strong ties represent high interaction, information flows and mutual knowledge, they 
also imply greater redundancy as unique qualities are absorbed or suppressed by the group. 
Weak ties imply brokerage between unconnected positions in the network and "the less one’s 
contacts know and interact with each other, the more likely the information and knowledge 
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available to these contacts will be non-redundant" (Moran, 2005, p. 1132). In other words we 
can visualize each MLA partner as a doorkeeper between the inner and the outer world of 
inter-firm relations. When managing the MLA it is essential to keep the door open to both 
worlds and connect them to maintain constant stream of information about new opportunities. 
 
Embeddedness Theory 
An embeddedness perspective (Baum & Dutton, 1996; Dacin, Ventresca & Beal, 1999; 
Granovetter, 1985; Polanyi, 1944) suggests that firms’ actions are constrained on one hand by 
resource endowments and on the other hand by a network of relations. The concept of 
embeddedness in social networks comes from the simple observation that "most behavior is 
closely embedded in networks of inter-personal relations" (Granovetter, 1985, p. 504). The 
literature has examined the existence of embedded relations and how they create competitive 
advantage for firms and networks of firms (Granovetter, 1995; Gulati, 1995; Uzzi, 1997). 
Uzzi (1999: 482) defined embeddedness “…as the degree to which commercial transactions 
take place through social relations and networks of relations that use exchange protocols 
associated with social, non-commercial attachments to govern business dealings.” Alliance 
embeddedness, therefore, implies that actors are embedded in a network of enduring and 
repeated relations (Baum & Dutton, 1996; Burt, 1992; Dacin, Ventresca & Beal, 1999; 
Granovetter, 1992, 1985; Lomi, 1995).   
The relational, positional, and structural constitute the usual embeddedness types 
considered to influence alliances (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). Relational embeddedness 
symbolizes cohesive ties between actors that channel information about capabilities and 
abilities of others (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). Cohesive ties build trust, transparency and 
reduce uncertainty in existing and future partnerships (Burt and Knez 1995; Podolny 1994). 
Positional embeddedness stands for positional impact of the organization in the overall 
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alliance network structure and decisions over new ties (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). This type 
of embeddedness encapsulates the system roles actors occupy (Borgatti & Everett, 1994; 
Faust, 1988; Winship & Mandel, 1983). Structural embeddedness symbolizes the influence of 
relations around actors on their propensity to form relations with others (Granovetter, 1992; 
Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). This type of embeddedness shifts the focus to groups of actors and 
to informal information channels (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999).  
Hagedoorn (2006) suggests that embeddedness traverses several levels depending on the 
social context surrounding partnerships: environmental, interorganizational, and dyadic. 
Overembeddedness takes place when actors are entrenched in their relational environment 
facing a reduced pool of potential new partners (Hagedoorn, 2006). 
Based on the theoretical concepts we have covered so far in the chapter we have the 
building blocks to conceptualize the structure and dynamics inherent in MLA. In the section 
that follows we put forward a framework for MLA and offer several derived propositions.  
 
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF MLA 
 
Firms engaged in MLA are embedded in inter-firm relations on multiple levels as shown in 
Figure 2.  In the figure solid lines denote relations links among firms A through Xi, engaged 
in MLA. The broken lines denote relations links outside MLA, whereas the dotted rings show 
shared spheres, and solid rings denote proprietary (ego) spheres. E denotes alliance relations 
within the MLA; and E'ABCXi (i=1….n, partners, where n > 2) denotes a common sphere 
shared among all partners; EAB…ECXi, denote dyadic shared spheres within MLA. Dyadic 
links EAC, and EBXi are omitted to symbolize absence of structural holes between some 
partners, i.e. all possible links will never be exploited. And e denotes proprietary transaction 
partners; e'a…e'xi denote proprietary transaction partners shared in the alliance; eA…eXi, 
denote proprietary transaction partners not shared. Each relations layer is embedded (⊆ = 
  
11 
subset of) in another until we reach the set of all possible relations in society (E' ⊆ E ⊆ (e + 
e') ⊆ society). Interaction effects between MLA layers become more complex as the 
relations set becomes larger, but the intensity of relations becomes stronger as the relations 
set becomes smaller. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
 
Alliance Tensions and Proprietary Assets 
The sharing of proprietary assets in MLA can create an exit barrier if firms fear that 
ownership or uniqueness of the assets will become indistinct due to common alliance 
processes.3 Thus, the propensity to enter MLA increases if proprietary assets are either not 
shared at all or ring-fenced before sharing takes place. Ring-fencing means setting clear use 
and ownership rules, e.g. who owns new or promiscuous customers? 
Lazzarini (2008) argued that firms with extensive outside ties would have less 
commitment to MLA and sparseness would increase investment in formalization. We, 
however, argue that it is not the size of the external network that matters but the degree to 
which MLA partners can build and control proprietary assets embedded in the external 
network.  Selective sharing may strengthen MLA by balancing the tensions between 
flexibility and rigidity, cooperation and competition, increasing partner's commitment to low 
intensity common alliance processes. In this regard there must be a clear distinction between, 
on one hand, commitment to MLA in its entirety, and on the other hand, commitment to 
common alliance processes. We can assume that the attraction of new partners to MLA 
depends on potential exit costs. Since surprises are possible in any alliance, transaction 
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 This was demonstrated when Austrian Airlines left Qualiflyer for Star Alliance and had no FFP program on its 
own as Qualiflyer had merged all into one. Although each airline may have ownership of customer data records 
other MLA airlines could theoretically access those records after any one airline leaves the alliance. 
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networks and any unique resources need to be protected and tensions balanced.4 Going to the 
extreme, being too cooperative, straight-jackets the firm, and leads to lock-in. A firm may 
want such an outcome, but that would be an exception rather than a rule.5 
Multiple centers of gravity in MLA create opportunities for partners to mix or match 
resources, to exploit structural holes. Partners do not only exploit structural holes in the 
common sphere (EABCXi) but also in various dyadic spheres (EAB…ECXi , ea…exi , eA…eXi). 
Shared spheres denote bridging of structural holes, exploitation of opportunities enabled by 
each partner’s unique resources. The ability to exploit various relational spheres within MLA 
balances alliance tensions (Das & Teng, 2000), containing potential instability. A MLA only 
focusing on the common sphere (EABCXi) would be considered too rigid and cooperative. 
Likewise MLA focusing only on the dyadic spheres and neglecting the common sphere would 
be considered too flexible and competitive.  
Research has shown that the extensiveness of alliance features (number of different 
resources joined together between the various partners) increases duration (Gudmundsson, 
2011; Gudmundsson & Rhoades, 2001).6 In other words MLA containing many relational 
spheres embedded over several levels is a quintessence of balancing tensions. In MLA the 
flexibility to enter and exit external and internal dyadic spheres in the pursuit of opportunities 
enhances partners' ability to develop and maintain competitive advantage.7 Thus, MLA 
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 Small alliance groupings with limited opportunities EQA, Atlantic Excellence, Global Excellence, and 
Qualiflyer Group all collapsed because key members defected to competing groupings with larger membership 
and grander global vision. The first three had limited coverage and the last one was dense employing an equity 
investment strategy in partners to retain control and prevent defection. 
5
 This would probably have been the outcome if the Alcazar project had come about, a 1993 proposal to tie-up 
and then merge Austrian Airlines, KLM, Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS) and Swissair. The first known 
merger from within MLA (oneworld) was the merger between British Airways and Iberia. 
6
 Having experienced a collapse of previous alliances by defecting partners, Swissair wanted to prevent this 
happening in their Qualiflyer Group by taking equity investment in all the partners. This strategy ran the 
company to the ground and failed to build a globally attractive alliance, which type, the previous partners 
defected to. 
7
 The largest most disperse multilateral airline alliance STAR has had turnover of up to 55 percent higher per 
employee compared to the next MLA. Being concerned about network linkages and passenger flow potentials 
STAR had also about 40 percent more passengers per employee compared to the next MLA. STAR alliance has 
also the highest market share on three key transcontinental corridors out of four: Europe–Asia Pacific; N-
America–Asia; and Europe–N-America. 
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partners should enter and exit external and internal dyadic spheres more freely in the pursuit 
of opportunities than in a common sphere. 
 
Proposition 1a. Partners engaged in MLA liberated to exploit multilevel embedded 
relational spheres, perceive more balance between competition and cooperation, and are 
less likely to defect (long-term orientation). 
Proposition 1b. Partners engaged in MLA sharing fewer assets in the common sphere and 
more assets in dyadic spheres, perceive more balance between rigidity and flexibility, and 
are less likely to defect (long-term orientation).  
Proposition 1c. Partners engaged in MLA liberated to exploit multilevel embedded 
relational spheres, entering and exiting external and internal dyadic spheres in the pursuit 
of opportunities, are more likely to enjoy competitive advantage, and are less likely to 
defect (long-term orientation). 
 
Structural Holes, Network Position and Partner Variety 
McEvily and Zaheer (1999) pointed out that a network with a high ratio of structural holes 
can be a source of competitive advantage by providing ideas, knowledge and opportunities: 
we draw parallel with this analogy. Thus, the higher the ratio of non-redundant ties within 
MLA, the more value creating is the overall alliance for firms in central positions (Burt, 1992; 
Granovetter, 1974, 1985) and for partners having non-central but valuable positional assets 
attractive to bridge structural holes. The position of an actor within an alliance is an 
opportunity or a constraint.  The more central an actors’ position the greater the ability to 
exploit opportunities (Burt, 1992).  
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We draw parallel with recent organization and management related studies of networks 
emphasizing that some network positions generate fewer constraints than others and better 
access to information and resources (Burt, 1992; Salancik, 1995). Firms can aim to maximize 
non-redundant ties by entering partners with non-redundant ties and exit partners with 
redundant ties: The greater the number of partners with largely redundant ties the more 
intensive the competition between partners e.g. for the same customers. The more non-
occupied structural holes within a network, the greater the positional strength of partners 
possessing such opportunities. Leading us to conclude that from an ego perspective firms 
should maximize positional strength in MLA even if that means defection and occasional 
rearrangement between different MLA. Therefore, partner variety rather than partner 
homogeneity matters. To put it differently, MLA with high degree of partner variety has 
structural holes best exploited through flexible dyadic spheres. Likewise partners lacking 
variety, having many redundant ties, may have positional strength in another MLA. These 
dynamics may facilitate MLA processes by generating superior firm-specific and customer 
value.  
If benefits can be derived from complementary assets that are inaccessible outside the 
dyad, it strengthens ties. Strong ties are characterized by frequency and duration of interaction 
leading to sharing and exchanging of important resources (Lomi, 1997). However, partners 
commanding superior faculty, will not share entire transaction networks with inferior partners 
as uniqueness is a strategic asset, a source of competitive advantage. Thus, in MLA with large 
number of structural holes, dyadic ties will be formed on the basis of complementary assets to 
fill the holes. Thus, exclusive dyads in MLA may mean direct benefit for some partners and 
indirect benefits for other partners. For example, (see Figure 2) B and C have a direct 
interface to serve customers; A and B also have direct interface to serve customers, however, 
A and C have indirect interface through B to provide service to A's customers requiring to 
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pass through B to C. Since this is rare for A's customers the cost of a direct interface between 
A and C is higher than sharing the indirect interface through B. In other words, B becomes a 
broker that saves A transaction costs with C.   
There is a dark side to dyadic ties in MLA, namely their potential to block common MLA 
processes. MLA partners engaged in an advantageous exclusive dyadic sphere may resist 
common alliance processes that attempt to internalize their unique position for the good of all, 
raising alliance exit costs. Exit costs rise because of the trade-off between MLA uniqueness 
and individual firm uniqueness. Retaining strategic flexibility revolves around keeping 
alliance exit barriers down despite of harmonization processes. On the expectation of high 
exit costs a partner might be in a better position outside the MLA or in another MLA. A 
partner in a central position may gain from high intensity (high sunk costs and reversal costs) 
commonalities acting as lock-in, by internalizing other's unique resources, and control 
partners in non-central positions. Therefore, the stronger role various dyadic ties play in a 
multilateral alliance, the greater the resistance to move towards high intensity common 
alliance processes.8  
 
Proposition 2: Partners' variety in MLA facilitates the exploitation of structural holes but 
impedes high intensity common alliance processes (closure), reinforcing positional 
strength of individual partners. 
 
Multilevel Embeddedness 
Different levels of embeddedness can be identified within MLA. At the lowest level (above 
society, the total set of all possible relations) we find transaction networks (arms-length 
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 High intensity alliance processes would denote, for example, the creation of central platforms for information 
systems, without which the firm could not operate. 
  
16 
relations), then alliance networks, and at the highest level MLA relations: with the strength of 
ties increasing from level to level (see Table 2).  
Whereas, multilevel embeddedness opens up a larger network of structural holes, it also 
invites constraints as each member must reconcile consequences of own actions on others, 
more so at a high embeddedness level than at a low level. In other words the stronger the ties, 
the more embedded and constrained the action potential with regard to other partners. 
Partaking in MLA reduces the flexibility of partners to explore the full transaction network. A 
growing MLA with increased density (unless fixed number of partners) will involve more 
territorial overlaps and more compromises, eventually greatly reducing the action potential of 
partners.  
Overembeddedness, being trapped in one’s own-net, leads to inflexibility, in other words 
constraints (Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000; Uzzi, 1997). We draw a parallel with this notion in 
how MLA partners are embedded on several levels and over time the higher levels, the more 
constraining ones, are likely to play a greater role through steadily increasing relational 
intensity. However, each level implies both opportunities and constraints and the overall 
balance of the two determines the overall value of belonging to MLA. 
 
Proposition 3. Partners' higher level embeddedness will become more constraining as 
alliance processes strengthen ties over time, and the ability to bridge structural holes at the 
lower levels diminishes due to increased alliance density, leading to reduced positional 
strength of individual partners.  
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CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we have proposed a conceptual framework for understanding multilateral 
alliances (MLA) that involve common alliance processes, dyadic ties, and external transaction 
networks. Such alliances involve great complexity due to the nature of their multilevel 
embeddedness.  MLA emphasizes a degree of commonality among partners to provide 
integrated products and services across firm boundaries. Yet, multilevel embeddedness 
inhibits partners to go beyond low intensity commonalities to manage exit barriers.  
MLA partners in a central position can use common alliance processes to raise exit barriers 
for weaker partners and exercise control over them. Thus MLA managers need to balance a 
complex set of tensions to derive benefits at the same time that strategic flexibility is 
maintained. In other words, MLA partners need to balance the benefits derived from the 
heterogeneity of resources and the homogeneity of MLA products and services, rather than 
one exclusive of another. Partner variety increases the propensity to exploit structural holes, 
which can be both dyadic and MLA relational opportunity. However, the more important the 
external transaction networks as proprietary asset the higher the perceived risk of sharing the 
asset in the MLA. To put it differently, the more crucial the firms in the external transaction 
network to a partner's competitive advantage, the lower the action potential on common 
alliance processes.  
From a management viewpoint MLA needs to be understood as complex relationship 
networks spanning multiple levels: external, dyadic and multilateral. This research suggests a 
conceptual framework that results in a better understanding of partner behaviour vis-à-vis 
harmonization of alliance processes. It tells us how sharing of proprietary assets and the 
progression of common alliance processes can act as barriers to exit for firms, a concern for 
firms wanting to enter MLA. However, in a situation where MLA is covering several 
distinctive areas of cooperation, separation of proprietary assets and partner management of 
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specific cooperation features becomes a boundary choice question. If the benefit of the 
alliance relationship is superior to not entering the alliance, yet the risk associated with lock-
in is high, then it is necessary to ring-fence proprietary assets. By the same token if firms 
contemplating to join MLA are free to exploit opportunities generated by multilevel 
embeddedness and can broker between external and internal ties, sharing the external 
transaction network is less likely to pose a perceived exit barrier, but may still pose a threat to 
high intensity common alliance processes. 
Finally, in MLA there is an inherent paradox, namely the level of perceived entry barriers 
are reflected in the level of perceived exit barriers. In other words, low exit barriers facilitate 
alliance formation but act as an inhibitor for progressively stronger common alliance 
processes. This is because progressive increase in common processes increases sunk costs, 
inherent in the sharing of proprietary assets, facilitating alliance lock-in. In other words there 
is an important trade-off between firm- and MLA uniqueness, requiring difficult management 
choices as MLA relations progress over time. 
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Table 1. Defining Multi-partner Alliances 
Concept Definition Reference 
Multilateral alliance "composed of overarching agreements 
applicable to all members of the group." 
 
"A multilateral alliance has at least three 
members who have cooperative relationships 
with each other involving elements of 
commonality across all partners." 
 
"formalized multi-partner inter-firm relations 
that involve not only a collection of dyads, but 
also central organization and common alliance 
processes." 
 
Dos & Hamel, (1998), ctd. 
in Lazzarini (2008, p. 20) 
 
Gudmundsson, Lechner and 
De Boer (2002, p. 410) 
 
 
 
Used in this chapter. 
 
 
 
Constellation  
"an arena in which members are involved in 
generalized social exchanges." 
 
"a set of firms linked together through 
alliances and  that competes in a particular 
competitive domain." 
 
 
Das & Teng (2002, p. 446) 
 
 
Gomes-Casseres (2004, p. 
44) 
 
Alliance network "a network consists of all interactions between 
organizations in a population" 
 
"a set of two or more connected business 
relationships, in which each exchange relation 
is between business firms that are 
conceptualized as collective actors" 
 
"A set of linkages between many relatively 
comparable firms… or an international 
network of independent local…firms…" 
 
"collection of several alliances" 
 
 
Whetten (1981, p. 8) 
 
 
 
Anderson, Hakansson & 
Johanson (1994, p. 4) 
 
 
Doz & Hamel (1998, p. 222) 
 
 
 
Das & Teng (2002, p. 446) 
 
 
 
  
24 
 
 
Figure 1. Directional movement along the three tensions when entering MLA 
Flexibility Rigidity 
Long-term 
Short-term 
Competition 
Cooperation 
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Figure 2. A model of multilevel embeddedness in MLA  
Notes: Solid lines denote relations links among firms A...Xi, embedded in a multilateral alliance; broken lines 
denote relations links outside MLA; dotted rings show shared spheres; solid rings show proprietary (ego) 
spheres; E (E > 2) = alliance relations within MLA; i=1….n, partners; e = proprietary (ego) transaction partners 
outside MLA; e'a…e'xi = proprietary (ego) transaction partners shared in MLA; eA…eXi, = proprietary (ego) 
transaction partners not shared in MLA; EAB…ECXi = dyadic relations within MLA (dyadic links EAC , and EBXi 
are omitted to symbolize absence of structural holes); E'ABCXi = common relations within MLA. Multilevel 
embeddedness is denoted as (E' ⊆ E ⊆ (e + e') ⊆ S), where ⊆ = subset of, and S=society or set of all possible 
relations.  
EAB 
EBC 
eA 
eB 
eXi 
E'ABCXi 
A 
B 
Xi 
C 
eC 
ECXi 
EAXi 
e'b 
e'a 
e'c 
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Table 2. Multilevel Embeddedness in Multilateral Alliances 
Embeddedness Denotation1 
 
Relations Type Tensions Spheres 
Level 3 (E') 
⊆
2
 
E'ABCXi Multilateral (MLA) Rigid/cooperative/long-term Common sphere 
Level 2 (E) EAB…ECXi Dyadic (MLA) 
 
Rigid/cooperative/medium-
term 
Dyadic sphere 
eA…eXi Transaction network 
external not-shared 
Flexible/competitive/short-
term 
Dyadic sphere 
⊆ 
Level 1 (e + e') 
⊆ 
S 
e'a…e'xi Transaction network 
external shared 
Flexible/competitive/short-
term 
Dyadic sphere 
Notes: 1 See Figure 2 for explanations. 2 ⊆= subset-of. 
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